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Abstract: As other fields of law, competition law is put to the test by
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discusses important competition cases regarding algorithms,
including the Google Shopping, Lufthansa and Facebook case. It
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1. Introduction
‘Success in creating AI would be the biggest event in human history.
Unfortunately, it may also be the last, unless we learn how to avoid
the risks’.1
Two pricing algorithms, competing to sell a genetics textbook,
strategized their interaction so ‘cleverly’ that they ended up – not
quite – selling the book for USD 23 million a copy.2
Although competition law may not be among the first topics one
associates with algorithms3 or Artificial Intelligence (AI)4, it is
certainly one area of law that starts to take a closer look at the
phenomenon, and rightfully so. The use of algorithms does not only
present great chances to economy and society, it can also lead to
undesirable results, on a large and a small scale. The algorithms used
today can be surprisingly low in their level of sophistication.
However, as they become more complex and move towards an
‘intelligent’ state, they are likely to disruptively change almost all
areas of human life. Even the – when compared with ‘true’ AI –
simple algorithms widely deployed in many different industries today
can have a far-reaching impact on the forms of and conditions for
competitive business conduct in these markets.5 This fact in itself
mandates competition law to scrutinize algorithmic implications and
to intervene where they risk distorting competition. The interaction of
algorithms and its collusive potential is (at present) one focal point of
this mandate,6 another example is big data-based market power.7 It
1 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-
looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-but-are-we-taking-9313474.html
(all internet sources last accessed 12 October 2018).
2 Cf. Margrethe Vestager’s speech, Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference on
Competition, 16 March 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/bundeskartellamt-18th-conference-competition-
berlin-16-march-2017_en.
3 An algorithm can be defined as a precise sequence of instructions to perform a
task, see for instance https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/algorithm.
4 The term AI was coined by John McCarthy in 1956 and now commonly refers to
machines imitating human intelligence, see for the different definitions on AI
Bernard Marr, The Key Definitions Of Artificial Intelligence (AI) That Explain Its
Importance, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/14/the-key-
definitions-of-artificial-intelligence-ai-that-explain-its-importance/#3c01e9874f5d;
machine learning, a subfield of AI, refers to algorithms that learn from data and
experience to build intelligent machines; deep learning, a subfield of machine
learning, is based on faster and more accurate learning, although no information on
the decision-making process will be known (OECD (2017), Algorithms and
Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age, 9-11,
www.oecd.org/competition/algorithms-collusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-
age.htm).
5 OECD, supra n. 4, at 11-14.
6 Cf. infra section 3.1.
7 Cf. infra section 3.2.
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seems not clear, though, that competition law has, in its present shape,
the necessary rules and techniques to perform the task. Thus, it may be
helpful to look at other areas of the law, which are more advanced in
this respect, and to learn from their experience.
There is, however, yet another prong to the interaction of
digitalization and competition law which forms part of a broader
trend: In the EU at least, competition law enforcement has proven to
be a tool of considerable efficiency.8 It can, therefore, appear
attractive to use this tool for resolving issues which do not belong to
the core realm and goals of competition law – although they may be
related to them. Outside the (direct) algorithmic context, the
application of competition law to the licensing of intellectual property
(IP) seems, in part, driven by this trend.9 Within the context of
algorithms, (consumer) data protection may become a prominent
example.10 As legal rules are, to a large extent, subordinate to the
goals society wants to achieve with them, the employment of
competition law to address issues beyond the mere protection of
undistorted competition is not inherently flawed, especially where
such issues are closely linked to an undistorted competitive process. It
seems worthwhile, though, to ponder whether other areas of the law
may, given their structure and resources, be in a better position to do
the job.
Against this background, the present paper pursues a threefold,
‘tool-box-oriented’ task: Its second section assesses important
examples of how other areas of the law deal with algorithm-based
market activity.11 The third section sketches three prototypical
competitive concerns algorithms may evoke.12 In the paper’s fourth
section, we ask whether competition law’s present tool-box suffices to
tackle these concerns, to which extent it may adopt tools used in other
areas of the law, and whether, beyond mere adaptation, the
development of new instruments seems necessary.13 The final section
summarizes and tries to sketch how our findings may induce a
reflection on the allocation of algorithm-related tasks between
different areas of the law.14
8 This is illustrated by the prominent cases against big tech companies. Besides cases
against Google (cf. infra section 3.2[a] and n. 145) and Facebook (on the German
Bundeskartellamt’s inquiry cf. infra section 3.3), the EU Commission is now also
investigating against Amazon (https://www.ft.com/content/a8c78888-bc0f-11e8-
8274-55b72926558f).
9 Peter Picht, Unwired Planet v. Huawei: A Seminal SEP/FRAND Decision from the
UK, (7) GRUR Int. 569, 576-577 (2017).
10 Cf. infra section 3.3.
11 Cf. infra section 2.
12 Cf. infra section 3.
13 Cf. infra section 4.
14 Cf. infra section 5.
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2. The legal tool box for algorithms outside competition law –
examples and categories
2.1. Regulation of algorithmic trading in financial markets
With the implementation of algorithmic trading, financial markets
were among the first to broadly and intensely deploy algorithms as a
technical basis for economic market activity. Financial market
regulation had to react and developed a comparatively detailed set of
rules on algorithmic trading. As to the EU,15 Germany pioneered with
its ‘Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz’16 and the EU followed suit, issuing
the Directive ‘on markets in financial instruments’17 (MiFID II).
Based to a large extent on the European Securities and Market
Authority’s (‘ESMA’)18 Guidelines on ‘Systems and Controls in an
Automated Trading Environment for Trading Platforms, Investment
Firms and Competent Authorities’,19 the Directive deals in meticulous
detail with several aspects of algorithmic trading (AT) and high-
frequency trading (HFT). Until 3 March 2019, the European
Commission will present a report to the European Parliament and the
Council on the impact of MiFID’s AT/HTF requirements.20 Its
findings should be thoroughly considered when implementing similar
tools in competition law.
According to MiFID II terminology, AT means the automatic
determination of an order by a computer algorithm with minimal or no
human intervention.21 HFT is considered to be a subset of AT in
which ‘a trading system analyses data or signals from the market at
high speed and then sends or updates large numbers of orders within a
very short time period in response to that analysis’.22 AT, and HFT in
particular, can have positive effects on financial markets, for instance
by improving order execution, increasing market liquidity as well as
trading volume, narrowing bid and ask spreads, and reducing short
15 Rules in other jurisdictions, such as Switzerland or the United States, are not
examined in this paper.
16 Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz of 7 May 2013 – Bundesgesetzblatt 2013 Teil I Nr.
23, 14 May 2013, 1162-1166, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP17/479/
47951.html.
17 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May
2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and
Directive 2011/61/EU.
18 https://www.esma.europa.eu; see for Technical standards under Directive
2004/39/EC (MiFID I), Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II) and Regulation (EU) No
600/2014 (MiFIR): http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/isd/mifid/its-rts-
overview-table_en.pdf.
19 Recital 63 MiFID II; see for the guidelines https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/library/2015/11/esma_2012_122_en.pdf.
20 Art. 90 para. 1 (c) MiFID II.
21 Art. 4 para. 1 (39) and Recital 59 MiFID II.
22 Recital 61 MiFID II; more precise definition in Art. 4 para. 1 (40) MiFID II.
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term volatility.23 But they can also pose specific risks, for example an
increased likelihood for duplicate or erroneous orders, possible
‘automatic’ overreactions to market events, or information
asymmetries resulting from an inequality of technical (viz. mainly:
algorithmic) arms.24 To fight these risks, MiFID II uses a combination
of measures directed at firms engaging in algorithmic or high-
frequency trading, at those providing electronic access, and at
operators of trading venues.25 In addition to MiFID II, the EU Market
Abuse regulation (MAR)26 prohibits some activities relating to
algorithmic and high-frequency trading by qualifying them as market
manipulation.27
2.1.[a] Investment firms
MiFID II sets up several duties for firms engaging in AT and HFT.28
In particular,29 they shall have in place:30
- ‘effective systems and risk controls suitable to the business it
operates to ensure that its trading systems are resilient and
have sufficient capacity, are subject to appropriate trading
thresholds and limits and prevent the sending of erroneous
orders or the systems otherwise functioning in a way that
may create or contribute to a disorderly market’;
- ‘effective systems and risk controls to ensure the trading
systems cannot be used for any purpose that is contrary to’
the MAR31 ‘or to the rules of a trading venue to which it is
connected’;
- ‘effective business continuity arrangements to deal with any
failure of its trading systems’.
23 Recital 62 MiFID II; see also Megan Woodward, The Need for Speed: Regulatory
Approaches to High Frequency Trading in the United States and the European
Union, 50 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1359, 1368-1369 (2017).
24 Recital 62 MiFID II.
25 Recital 63 MiFID II.
26 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive
2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission
Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC.
27 Art. 12 para. 2 lit. c MAR.
28 Since HFT is a subset of AT, specific rules on AT also apply to investment firms
engaging in HFT (Danny Busch, MiFID II: regulating high frequency trading, other
forms of algorithmic trading and direct electronic market access, 10(2) LFMR 72,
75 in fine (2016)).
29 Besides, i.a., requiring authorisation (Art. 5 MiFID II).
30 Art. 17 para. 1 MiFID II.
31 Cf. supra n. 26.
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To ensure that they meet these requirements, investment firms shall
fully test and properly monitor their systems.32 Regulatory Technical
Standards 6 (RTS 6) set out the details of the organizational
requirements for this testing and monitoring exercise.33 The testing
requirements include testing prior to deployment or update of the
algorithms,34 an appropriate allocation of responsibilities,35 as well as
a testing approach that secures the algorithm’s conformance with the
system of the trading venue or of the direct market access provider.36
Some of the tests have to be undertaken in a sandbox-like testing
environment.37 An annual self-assessment and validation
requirement38 includes a stress testing of the algorithmic trading
system.39 The monitoring side includes the requirement to establish a
‘kill functionality’ resulting in the cancelation of some or all orders as
an emergency measure.40 As stated above, disruptive events must also
be pre-emptively addressed by concluding business continuity
agreements.41 Furthermore, algorithmic trading activity ought to be
monitored real-time,42 and ESMA requests a surveillance of the
systems of the investment firm for market manipulation.43
Several requirements touch on the investment firm’s duty to
document and store information:
- Investment firms engaging in algorithmic trading are required
to notify this to the competent authorities of the trading venue
and of its Member State.44
32 Art. 17 para. 1 MiFID II.
33 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/589 of 19 July 2016 supplementing
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to
regulatory technical standards specifying the organizational requirements of
investment firms engaged in algorithmic trading, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0589&from=EN.
34 Art. 5 RTS 6.
35 Art. 5 para. 3 RTS 6; cf. also Art. 1 and Recital 3 RTS 6: ‘As a part of its overall
governance framework and decision making framework, an investment firm should
have a clear and formalised governance arrangement, including clear lines of
accountability, effective procedures for the communication of information and a
separation of tasks and responsibilities’.
36 Art. 6 RTS 6.
37 Art. 7 RTS 6: ‘an environment that is separated from its production environment
and that is used specifically for the testing and development of algorithmic trading
systems and trading algorithms’. For sandboxing in financial markets see also the




38 Art. 9 RTS 6.
39 Art. 10 RTS 6.
40 Art. 12 RTS 6.
41 Art. 14 RTS 6.
42 Art. 16 RTS 6.
43 Art. 13 RTS 6.
44 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 1 MiFID II.
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- The latter may require the investment firm to provide
(regularly or ad-hoc) ‘a description of the nature of its
algorithmic trading strategies, details of the trading
parameters or limits to which the system is subject, the key
compliance and risk controls that it has in place to ensure the
conditions laid down in paragraph 1 are satisfied and details
of the testing of its systems. The competent authority of the
home Member State of the investment firm may, at any time,
request further information from an investment firm about its
algorithmic trading and the systems used for that trading’.45
- In any case, such information has to be passed on at the
request of competent authorities of a trading venue at which
the investment firm undertakes algorithmic trading.46
- All this information has to be documented.47
- Moreover, investment firms engaging in HFT48 have to keep
accurate and time sequenced records of all orders and make
them available to the competent authority upon request.49
Mere mention be made of a set of provisions applying to market
making strategies of AT investment firms50 and of duties related to an
investment firm’s granting traders direct electronic access to a trading
venue.51 These rules address algorithmic trading activity but they are
keyed very specifically to the financial sector and, hence, of limited
transfer value.
2.1[b] Trading Venues
In general, trading venues52 shall establish resilient and tested trading
systems and shall be able to deal with large order volumes and
markets under stress.53 Trading venues to which AT and HFT traders
are connected have to meet additional requirements laid down in
45 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 2 MiFID II.
46 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 3 MiFID II.
47 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 4 MiFID II.
48 If they only engage in AT, they must also keep their transaction data due to the
general provisions of Art. 25 MiFIR (Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments
and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012) and Art. 16 para. 6 MiFID II.
49 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 5 MiFID II.
50 Art. 17 para. 3 MiFID II.
51 Cf. Art. 4 para. 1 (41), Art. 17 para. 5 MiFID II; cf. in detail Busch, supra n. 28, at
75 and 77-78.
52 Consisting of regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) and
organized trading facilities (OTFs), cf. Art. 4 para. 1 (24) MiFID II.
53 Art. 48 para. 1 MiFID II for regulated markets, in conjunction with Art. 18 para. 5
MiFID II for MTFs and OTFs.
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Regulatory Technical Standards 7 (RTS 7).54 These include
monitoring obligations regarding the adaptation and robustness of
their AT systems, including real-time monitoring of their performance
and capacity as well as of member’s orders,55 and a periodical review
of the performance and capacity of the algorithmic trading systems as
a whole.56 Furthermore, trading venues shall have in place a kill
functionality to be able to cancel certain orders,57 carry out a due
diligence regarding their members,58 and test their trading systems.59
As a kind of compensation, trading venues are permitted to charge
higher fees for AT and HFT.60
Similar to investment firms, trading venues are required to ‘have
in place effective systems, procedures and arrangements, including
requiring members or participants to carry out appropriate testing of
algorithms and providing environments to facilitate such testing, to
ensure that algorithmic trading systems cannot create or contribute to
disorderly trading conditions on the market and to manage any
disorderly trading conditions which do arise from such algorithmic
trading systems’.61 These tests include a requirement for the members
to conduct conformance testing in the testing environment of the
trading venue62 so as to avoid disorderly trading conditions.63 Trading
venue members must flag and trading venues must be able to identify
algorithmic orders, as well as the used algorithms and their initiator,
and the venues must provide this information to competent authorities
upon request.64
2.2. General Data Protection Regulation
Data protection law is another area that already has in place certain
elements of a legal framework for algorithmic (market) activity. This
is true, in particular, for the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation
54 Busch, supra n. 28, at 78; Art. 1 para. 1 of Commission Delegated Regulation
(EU) 2017/584 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical
standards specifying organizational requirements of trading venues, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32017R0584&from=EN.
55 Art. 12 RTS 7.
56 Art. 14 RTS 7.
57 Art. 18 para. 2 (c) RTS 7.
58 Art. 7 RTS 7.
59 Art. 8 RTS 7.
60 Art. 48 para. 9 subpara. 3 (regulated markets) and Art. 18 para. 5 (MTFs and
OTFs) MiFID II.
61 Art. 48 para. 6 MiFID II.
62 Art. 9 RTS 7.
63 Art. 10 RTS 7.
64 Art. 48 para. 10 MiFID II.
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(GDPR),65 but also for the ePrivacy Regulation probably to be enacted
sometime in 2019, forming a lex specialis to the GDPR, and applying
i.a. to machine-to-machine communication.66
The GDPR includes,67 in its Art. 22 para. 1, a provision that
gives the data subject68 ‘the right not to be subject to a decision based
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces
legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects
him or her’. Art. 4(4) GDPR defines profiling as ‘any form of
automated processing69 of personal data consisting of the use of
personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural
person’. As an addition to Art. 22, recital 71 formulates some
requirements for profiling algorithms, which ‘should use appropriate
mathematical or statistical procedures’ to minimize the risk of errors
and prevent discriminatory effects.70 A decision based solely on
automated processing is permissible, if it ‘is necessary for entering
into, or performance of, a contract’71 or if it the data subject has given
his explicit consent.72 In such cases, however, the ‘data controller’ has
a duty to implement suitable procedures, with a minimum standard of
protection consisting of a right of the data subject to obtain human
65 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). On the Regulation in general, see
Tobias Lettl, Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO), (25) WM 1149 (2018);
Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Vagelis Papakonstantinou, Gerrit Hornung & Paul de
Hert, European General Data Protection Regulation, C.H.Beck forthcoming.
66 Cf. Recital 12 of the proposed Directive (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/proposal-regulation-privacy-and-electronic-communications):
‘Connected devices and machines increasingly communicate with each other by
using electronic communications networks (Internet of Things). The transmission of
machine-to-machine communications involves the conveyance of signals over a
network and, hence, usually constitutes an electronic communications service. In
order to ensure full protection of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of
communications, and to promote a trusted and secure Internet of Things in the
digital single market, it is necessary to clarify that this Regulation should apply also
to the machine-to-machine communications whenever these are related to users.
Therefore, the principle of confidentiality enshrined in this Regulation should also
apply to the transmission of machine-to-machine communications. Specific
safeguards could also be adopted under sectorial legislation, as for instance
Directive 2014/53/EU.’
67 The preceding Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data already contained a similar
provision in Art. 15.
68 See Art. 4(1) GDPR.
69 And thus encompassing algorithms, cf. Mario Martini, Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz: DS-GVO BDSG, Art. 22 para. 21
(Boris P. Paal & Daniel A. Pauly, 2nd ed., C.H.Beck 2018).
70 Martini, supra n. 69, at Art. 22 para. 36.
71 Art. 22 para. 2 lit. a GDPR.
72 Art. 22 para. 2 lit. b GDPR.
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intervention and to express his or her point of view if he/she wishes to
contest the decision.73 The definition of ‘suitable measures’ does,
however, not seem to go as far as to require the algorithm to be
disclosed.74 Art. 13 para. 2 lit. f75 GDPR stipulates that the use of
automated decision making shall be communicated to the data subject,
including ‘meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as
the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing
for the data subject.’ It is disputed whether Art. 13 constitutes a duty
to disclose the algorithm itself, with the leading opinion answering
this question in the negative because this would result in a forced
disclosure of trade secrets.76 Art. 22 GDPR tries to mitigate the risks
associated with automated decision-making based on algorithms.77
While the provision’s implications appear limited78 due to its narrow
focus on automation without human interference, it is at least an
attempt at protecting citizens from uncontrolled algorithmic decision-
making.79
Under Art. 20 GDPR and its corresponding Guidelines80 and
Recitals, the ‘data subject shall have the right to receive the personal
data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a
controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable
format and have the right to transmit those data to another controller
without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data have
been provided’. This ‘data portability right’ applies to all sectors of
the economy and conveys not necessarily ownership of but certainly a
73 Art. 22 para. 3 GDPR.
74 Martini, supra n. 69, at Art. 22 para. 36; Benedikt Buchner, Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz: DS-GVO/BDSG, Art. 22 para. 35
(Jürgen Kühling & Benedikt Buchner, 2nd ed., C.H.Beck 2018); Sandra Wachter,
Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation of Automated
Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7(2)
IDPL 76, 94 (2017).
75 Cf. also Art. 14 para. 2 lit. g and Art. 15 para. lit. h GDPR.
76 Boris Paal & Moritz Hennemann, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung,
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz: DS-GVO BDSG, Art. 13 para. 31 (Boris P. Paal & Daniel
A. Pauly, 2nd ed., C.H.Beck 2018); Holger Greve, Europäische
Datenschutzgrundverordnung, Art. 12 para. 7 (Gernot Sydow, 2nd ed., Nomos
2018); Marcus Helfrich, id., Art. 22 para. 79 (regarding Art. 15 para. 1 lit. h GDPR);
Matthias Bäcker, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz: DS-
GVO/BDSG, Art. 13 para. 54 (Jürgen Kühling & Benedikt Buchner, 2nd ed.,
C.H.Beck 2018); Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra n. 74, at 89-90.
77 Martini, supra n. 69, Art. 22 para. 8.
78 Ulrich Dammann, Erfolge und Defizite der EU-Datenschutzgrundverordnung,
Erwarteter Fortschritt, Schwächen und überraschende Innovationen, (7) ZD 307,
312-313 (2016).
79 OECD, supra n. 4, at 49; Martini, supra n. 69, at Art. 22 para. 46.
80 The so-called ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Party’, a body composed of
representatives of the Member States’ data protection authorities, of the European
Data Protection Supervisor, and of the European Commission, issued Guidelines on
Art. 20 GDPR, see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the
right to data portability, 5 April 2017, 16/EN WP 242 rev.01,
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=611233.
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far-reaching right to control and duplicate the use of the pertinent
personal data.81 Its potential implications are manifold and far-
reaching. Among them are the questions of how to define ‘personal
data … provided to a controller’, the only type of data subject to the
portability right;82 of how a data subject may use its portability right
as a basis for transacting over its data, e.g. by assigning to third parties
a claim to access the data; of whether the data subject must wait until
the controller has collected and assembled the data or whether Art. 20
GDPR implies a right to directly collect data regardless of the
collector’s business secrets being affected by such an act; of whether
portability creates an ownership-like control over ported data; or of
how to balance, mainly in the application of Art. 20 para. 4 GDPR,83
the portability right with intellectual property rights extending to the
respective data.84
Other provisions of the GDPR may be relevant for algorithms as
well. Self-learning algorithms (and their use), for instance, may
qualify as a form of ‘new technologies’ under Art. 35 para. 1 GDPR,
thus requiring a prior data protection impact assessment of the
envisaged processing operations.85 The GDPR also stipulates ‘data
protection by design and by default’.86 This refers to the requirements
of implementing, already in the design phase, appropriate technical
and organisational measures to protect the data subject’s rights,87 and
of processing, by default, only data necessary for the respective,
specific purpose.88
81 Inge Graef, Martin Husovec & Nadezhda Purtova, Data Portability and Data
Control, Lessons for an Emerging Concept in EU Law, (22) Tilburg Law School
Legal Studies Research Paper Series 1, 5, 7, 19 (2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071875.
82 On this, see Colette Cuijpers, Nadezhda Purtova & Eleni Kosta, Data Protection
Reform and the Internet: the Draft Data Protection Regulation, 558 (Andrej Savin
& Jan Trzaskowski, Research Handbook on EU Internet Law, Edward Elgar 2014);
Graef, Husovec & Purtova, supra n. 81, at 9-10.
83 Art. 20 para. 4 GDPR states that ‘[t]he right referred to in paragraph 1 shall not
adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others’ and provides, thereby, the basis
for a balancing of the data portability right against other affected rights, such as the
right to freedom of expression and information (Art. 11 Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union) or intellectual property rights relating to the data to-
be-ported; see Hans-Georg Kamann & Martin Braun, Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung: DS-GVO, Art. 20 para 33-37 (Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr,
2nd ed., C.H.Beck 2018).
84 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra n. 80, at 12; Graef, Husovec &
Purtova, supra n. 81, at 10-13.
85 Martini, supra n. 69, at Art. 35 para. 18 and 77.
86 Art. 25 and Recital 78 GDPR.
87 Joachim Schrey, New European General Data Protection Regulation: A
Practicioner’s Guide, para. 530 (Daniel Rücker & Tobias Kugler, C.H.Beck 2018).
88 Schrey, supra n. 87, at para. 533.
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2.3. Categorizing regulatory tools
The numerous, detailed provisions dealing with algorithms, and the AI
they may drive, reflect, beyond context-related specificities, several
basic principles that are likely to be valid across various areas of the
law. In 2017, the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
published a statement on algorithmic transparency and
accountability89 that distinguishes seven fundamental principles,
namely awareness,90 access and redress,91 accountability,92
explanation,93 data provenance,94 auditability95 and validation and
testing.96 Similarly, an analysis of the policy instruments under
consideration by the House of Commons Science and Technology
Committee on ‘algorithms in decision-making’ by Leighton Andrews
led to the following classification:97 Technical,98 governance,99
89 Statement on Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability, by ACM U.S. Public
Policy Council and ACM Europe Policy Committee, updated 25 May 2017,
https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/public-policy/2017_joint_statement_
algorithms.pdf.
90 ‘Owners, designers, builders, users, and other stakeholders of analytic systems
should be aware of the possible biases involved in their design, implementation, and
use and the potential harm that biases can cause to individuals and society.’
91 ‘Regulators should encourage the adoption of mechanisms that enable questioning
and redress for individuals and groups that are adversely affected by algorithmically
informed decisions.’
92 ‘Institutions should be held responsible for decisions made by the algorithms that
they use, even if it is not feasible to explain in detail how the algorithms produce
their results.’
93 ‘Systems and institutions that use algorithmic decision-making are encouraged to
produce explanations regarding both the procedures followed by the algorithm and
the specific decisions that are made. This is particularly important in public policy
contexts.’
94 ‘A description of the way in which the training data was collected should be
maintained by the builders of the algorithms, accompanied by an exploration of the
potential biases induced by the human or algorithmic data-gathering process. Public
scrutiny of the data provides maximum opportunity for corrections. However,
concerns over privacy, protecting trade secrets, or revelation of analytics that might
allow malicious actors to game the system can justify restricting access to qualified
and authorized individuals.’
95 ‘Models, algorithms, data, and decisions should be recorded so that they can be
audited in cases where harm is suspected.’
96 ‘Institutions should use rigorous methods to validate their models and document
those methods and results. In particular, they should routinely perform tests to assess
and determine whether the model generates discriminatory harm. Institutions are
encouraged to make the results of such tests public.’
97 Leighton Andrews, Algorithms, governance and regulation: beyond ‘the
necessary hashtags’, (85) LSE Discussion Paper 7, 18 (2017),
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/research/centres/telos/assets/DP85-Algorithmic-
Regulation-Sep-2017.pdf.
98 Transparency, accountability and explicability; best practice; training data of
algorithm to be prescribed; distinctions between basic and machine learning
algorithms; further research on technical mechanisms to interrogate ‘black box’.
99 Internal compliance teams; GDPR compliance certification; public sector
algorithms to be analyzed in line with MacPherson review of government
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regulation,100 legislative101 and institutional,102 while noting the
absence of any fiscal instruments.
Trying to merge these principles and classifications, the
examples described above, and a number of further pertinent
provisions into a graticule of regulatory tools, one may arrive at the
following categorization:
Transparency
- Duty to inform (Art. 13 Abs. 2 lit. f GDPR), to describe (Art.
17 para. 2 subpara 2 MiFID II), to notify (Art. 17 para. 2
subpara. 1 MiFID II) and to flag (Art. 48 para. 10 MiFID II)
- Claims to information (Art. 15 Abs. 1 lit. h GDPR, Art. 17
para. 2 subpara. 3 and 5 MiFID II)
- Access and transfer rights (Art. 15 para. 3 and Art. 20 GDPR)
- Duty to document (Art. 16 para. 6 MiFID II) and to keep
reports (Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 4 MiFID II)
Prevention/deterrence
- Prohibition (Art. 22 para. 1 GDPR)
- Authorization (Art. 5 MiFID II)
- Impact assessment (Art. 35 para. 1 GDPR)
Intervention
- Kill functionality (Art. 12 RTS 6, Art. 18 para. 2 (c) RTS 7)
modelling; develop professional standards for data science; support role of
partnership for AI.
100 Sectoral statutory oversight body (e.g. police); new scrutiny and oversight duties
on existing regulators; requirements not to design algorithms which challenge
protected characteristics under HR law; requirement for EIAs or HIRIAs for
algorithms; GDPR as basis of regulation; medical algorithms to be subjected to
MHRA; CMA to investigate pricing algorithms.
101 Legally mandated ‘right to explanation’ of automated decisions to supplement
GDPR; Humanly interpretable decision-making methods in mandated risky sectors;
categorization of risky and non-risky sectors/mechanisms; right to challenge by
those affected; mandation of certification mechanisms to ensure fair, open and non-
discriminatory practices prior to deployment of algorithms.
102 Algorithmic or machine learning or data ethics oversight institution with proper
resourcing or/and capacity building for existing regulators; investment in public
R&D on algorithms; technical oversight and template design; analyses algorithmic
experience from creditscoring industry as potential for best practice in
accountability.
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- Business continuity agreements (Art. 14 RTS 6)
Standard setting
- Effective systems and risk control (Art. 17 para. 1 MiFID II)
- Requirements for algorithms (Recital 71 GDPR)
- (Data) protection by default and design (Art. 25 GDPR)
- Due diligence (Art. 14 RTS 7)
Liability – and its steering effect
- Disincentive fees (Art. 48 para. 9 subpara. 3 MiFID II)
- Allocation of responsibility (Art. 5 para 3 RTS 6)
Testing and monitoring (Art. 17 Para. 1 MiFID II)
- Ex-ante (Art. 5 RTS 6) and/or sandboxing (Art. 7 RTS 6)
- Real-time (Art. 16 RTS 6, Art. 13 RTS 6)




- Right of associations to initiate proceedings
- Mediation/arbitration bodies
- Specific unfair competition warning letters
- Competence to order specific measures (cf. testing and
transparency)
- Specific burden of proof
Broader regulatory framework105
- (Ethical) guidelines106
103 Cf. also Autocomplete, Az. VI ZR 269/12 (BGH 14 May 2013).
104 Cf. also infra section 4 and 5.
105 Cf. also infra section 4 and 5.
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- Self-regulation
- Certification of algorithms
- Artificial Intelligence Development Act107
- International Artificial Intelligence Organization108
3. Prominent algorithmic issues in the field of competition law
We cannot, today, foresee all the facets of AI and algorithmic market
activity which may come under competition law scrutiny and this
paper cannot even attempt to detail the gamut of constellations whose
relevance we already perceive. We therefore limit this section to three
types of cases that are both much discussed at present and potentially
prototypical for the intersection of algorithms and competition law.
3.1. Algo collusion109
The competitive process risks suffering harm when competitors make
arrangements regarding their market activity. Such arrangements are
usually called ‘collusion’ if they serve to raise the coordinating
parties’ profits above the non-cooperative equilibrium.110 ‘Explicit
collusion’ rests on an agreement or some other form of concertation
between the involved market players, while ‘tacit collusion’,111
oftentimes leading to ‘parallel behaviour’, requires no such
concertation and can, in particular, result from market players
monitoring and reacting to each other’s independent business
decisions.112 Both types of collusion are economically undesirable as
they tend to result in supra-competitive prices, lower output,
deadweight losses, and, ultimately, a reduction in (consumer)
106 See, for instance, the EU’s endeavor to ensure the transparency of algorithms,
which will be addressed in the AI ethics guidelines to be released by the end of the
year http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-3363_en.htm.
107 Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29(2) Harv. J.L. & Tech. 354 (2016).
108 Olivia J. Erdélyi & Judy Goldsmith, Regulating Artificial Intelligence, Proposal
for a Global Solution, http://www.aies-conference.com/2018/contents/papers/main/
AIES_2018_paper_13.pdf.
109 This section is based to a large extend on Peter Georg Picht & Benedikt Freund,
Competition (law) in the era of Algorithms, 39(9) E.C.L.R. 403 (2018).
110 OECD, supra n. 4, at 19; cf. also Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics –
A modern Approach, 531-532 (9th ed., W. W. Norton & Company 2014).
111 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 52-53 (2nd ed., University of Chicago
Press 2001).
112 Michael K. Vaska, Conscious Parallelism and Price-fixing: Defining the
Boundary, 52(2) U Chi L Rev 508, 509, 519-520 (1985); cf. also Picht & Freund,
supra n. 109, at 404.
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welfare.113 Nonetheless, most competition law regimes prohibit – at
present – only explicit collusion while tolerating tacit collusion and
parallel behaviour, not least because banning tacit collusion may
inhibit market players from intelligently adapting their business
strategy to their competitors’ prices or other market conditions – after
all a key component of competitive behaviour.114
Algorithms can, in various ways, be tools for establishing
explicit collusion.115 The use of identical pricing algorithms by
competitors, for instance, is – arguably – not unlawful as such116 but it
can help competitors to unlawfully align their prices as part of a joint
and consented strategy reducing competitive pressure.117 Instead of
113 OECD, supra n. 4, at 19-20; Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition
Law, Text, Cases and Materials, 650 (6th ed., Oxford University Press 2016).
114 For the EU: Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v. Commission, C-89/85, para. 71
(ECJ 31 March 1993); Suiker Unie and Others v Commission, C-40/73, para. 174
(ECJ 16 December 1975); cf. also Jones & Sufrin, supra. n. 113, at 694-698; for the
US: In re: Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, No. 14-2301, 10-11 (7th Cir. 9 April
2015).
115 Cf. Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When
Computers Inhibit Competition, U. Ill. L. Rev. 1775, 1784-1787 (2017).
116 See Advocate General Szpunar’s remark in a footnote in the Uber case: ‘the use
by competitors of the same algorithm to calculate the price is not in itself unlawful,
but might give rise to hub-and-spoke conspiracy concerns when the power of the
platform increases’ (Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, C‑434/15, fn. 23 (Opinion
of Advocate General Szpunar 11 May 2017)).
117 United States v. David Topkins, Plea Agreement, No. CR 15 201 WHO (N.D.
Cal. 30 April 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/628891/downlo
ad; United States v. David Topkins, No. CR 15 201 WHO (N.D. Cal. 6 April 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/513586/download; cf. also Salil K.
Mehra, US v. Topkins: Can Price Fixing be Based on Algorithms?, 7(7) JIPLP 470
(2016); Virgílio Pereira, Algorithm-driven Collusion: Pouring old wine into new
Bottles or new wine into Fresh Wineskins?, 39(5) ECLR 212, 214-215 (2018); Jill
Priluck, When Bots Collude, https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/when-
bots-collude; according to the Commission’s report on the E-commerce Sector
Inquiry 67 % of the 53 % of respondents tracking competitor’s prices do so by
automated systems and 78 % of those 67 % adjust their prices (European
Commission, Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, 15 September
2016, SWD(2016) 312, 56, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiry_
preliminary_report_en.pdf); for an empirical analysis of algorithmic pricing on
Amazon Marketplace see Le Chen, Alan Mislove & Christo Wilson, An Empirical
Analysis of Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon Marketplace,
https://mislove.org/publications/Amazon-WWW.pdf; cf. also the algorithmic resale
price maintenance case involving Asus, Denon & Marantz, Philips and Pioneer,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4601_en.htm; Michal Gal sees possible
unlawful conduct where competitors (1) start consciously using similar algorithms,
despite better algorithms being available, (2) feed the same or similar training data
to the learning algorithm, despite better training data being available and despite the
awareness of the possibility of similar pricing results, or (3) make the algorithm
transparent to competitors without any procompetitive justification (Caron Beaton-
Wells, Competition Lore Podcast, Competition and algorithms – friend or foe?,
episode of 19 September 2018, https://overcast.fm/+N2zZD5F3Q/55:13).
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such a decentralized strategy, competitors may jointly implement118 a
‘hub and spoke’ cartel, for instance119 by delegating the setting of
prices (and potentially other conditions) to a central, algorithmic
agent.120 The coordination necessary to establish the hub and spoke
structure typically requires some form of explicit collusion. The
‘signalling’ strategy – another option – employs algorithms to
exchange concealed information about (planned) market behaviour by
sending, as it were, a Morse code, for instance in the form of
patterned, short-term price changes which are being planned, executed
and registered by algorithms.121
Whatever the strategy, explicit collusion remains illegal,
regardless of whether it is being implemented by traditional, analogue
techniques or by cutting-edge algorithms.122 The challenges
algorithmic explicit collusion presents consist, hence, not in deciding
whether such conduct should be banned but rather in assessing its
likelihood, detecting it in specific cases, and assigning appropriate
liability.123 Compared to more old-fashioned scenarios, several factors
can complicate the uncovering of algorithmic collusion. For instance,
algorithms can run their direct interaction at much higher speed than
coordination involving humans (more directly)124,125 they can cloak it
– in certain respects126 – in patterns more complex than those of
118 Hub and spoke settings are more likely to occur as the result of explicit collusion,
although they may also result from implicit collusion.
119 For further variants and details, see Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 115, at 1787-
1788.
120 Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15 Civ. 9796, Opinion and Order (S.D.N.Y. 31 March
2016); Eturas and Others, C-74/14 (ECJ 21 January 2016); see also Andreas
Heinemann & Aleksandra Gebicka, Can Computers Form Cartels? About the Need
for European Institutions to Revise the Concertation Doctrine in the Information
Age, 7(7) JECLAP 431 (2016).
121 OECD, supra n. 4, at 29-30.
122 Monopolkommission, XXII. Hauptgutachten: Wettbewerb 2018, para. 201,
https://www.monopolkommission.de/images/HG22/HGXXII_Gesamt.pdf; cf. also
EU Commission in its submission to the OECD: ‘if pricing practices are illegal
when implemented offline, there is a strong chance that they will be illegal as well
when implemented online’ (Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs
Competition Committee, Algorithms and Collusion – Note from the European
Union, 14 June 2017, 9,
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)12/en/pdf).
123 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 2018, supra n. 122, at para. 215,
according to which algorithms represent the prior will of the user but a shift in
liability may have to be considered regarding self-learning algorithms.
124 Humans can be involved in algorithmic-collusion as well, of course, but more
indirectly, as coders, implementers, beneficiaries, etc., not as those directly
exercising the coordination.
125 OECD, supra n. 4, at 22 with reference to the Autorité de la Concurrence,
Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data, 14-15,
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20Data
%20Papier.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
126 Algorithms may be much better in devising and deciphering math patterns, but
they may be much weaker in decoding the non-verbal and non-mathematical
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human communication, and they are less (if at all) likely to succumb
to weaknesses – fatigue, emotions (fear, anger, regret), irrationality –
humans often show in their communicative interaction.127
Where competition law enforcers manage, nonetheless, to
discover algorithmic collusion that violates the law, they must decide
on the liability of and on sanctions for the humans having built, coded,
implemented or profited from the colluding algorithm. This can pose
questions of justice and effective liability design which we will assess
in greater detail below.128 Suffice it here to say that the degree of
complexity and independence with which the algorithm operates
ought probably to matter in this respect. This is because humans – the
ultimate addressees of liability – exercise much more direct control
over ‘simple’ algorithms that merely execute patterns initially coded
into them129 than over so-called ‘deep learning’ algorithms130 which
are able to make decisions based on their own artificial neural
network, i.e. to a large extent independently of pre-set rules and
parameters.
The use of truly deep-learning algorithms as part of companies’
business models is purportedly rather limited at present.131 Such
algorithms are key drivers of AI, though, and very likely to spread
widely in the years to come. This invests the third challenge
mentioned above, viz. the assessment of and appropriate reaction to
the likelihood of algorithmic collusion, with great importance. Since
the illegality of explicit collusion is well established, an increased
likelihood of this type of conduct due to the spread of algorithmic
market activity mainly means that competition law enforcement ought
to allot additional and appropriate resources to the field.132
Tacit collusion requires a more fundamental reflection: Besides
other reasons,133 competition law has – so far and except for cases of
joint market dominance – tolerated134 the detrimental economic effects
of tacit collusion because conventional wisdom has it that this type of
conduct requires rather specific conditions to succeed. In a nutshell,
these conditions are (1) an oligopolistic market structure,135 (2)
communication (a look, a wink of the eyes, a handshake, an ambiguous expression)
with which humans are able to convey complex, multi-facetted messages.
127 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 115, at 1792-1793.
128 Cf. infra section 4 and 5.
129 Cf. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 115, at 1787.
130 Cf. OECD, supra n. 4, at 32.
131 Cf. OECD, supra n. 4, at 12, for applications of deep learning.
132 Cf. infra section 4 and 5.
133 Cf. supra section 3.1.
134 Joint market dominance only partially covers tacit collusion, cf.
Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 2018, supra n. 122, at para. 217-224.
135 Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, Oligopoly Experiments in the Current Millennium,
27(3) J. Econ. Surv. 439, 448 (2013).
Picht / Loderer: Framing Algorithms
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 18-24
19
homogeneity of goods and services in the market,136 (3) market
transparency,137 and (4) high barriers for market entry.138 Since these
conditions appear(ed) to be present in a few markets only, the
economic harm from tacit collusion seemed limited as well.139 If
(deep-learning) algorithms were to make tacit collusion less dependent
on its traditional preconditions and, overall, more likely,140
competition law’s present approach towards tacit collusion may have
to be reconsidered.141 Algorithms may have such an effect, inter alia
because they tend to increase transaction intensity,142 thereby
generating more data points with which to establish and control
collusive equilibria, because their ability to analyse (big) data helps to
understand competitors’ conduct,143 and because they are less prone
136 Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright & Jean Tirole, The
Economics of Tacit Collusion, Final Report for DG Competition, 47, 66 (2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_col
lusion_en.pdf.
137 See Christian Schultz, Transparency on the Consumer Side and Tacit Collusion,
49(2) Eur. Econ. Rev 279, 280 (2003).
138 OECD, supra n. 4, at 20-21; Michal S. Gal, Algorithmic-Facilitated
Coordination: Market and Legal Solutions, 2 Antitrust Chronicle, 22-23 (2017),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/AC_May.pdf.
139 Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of
Algorithms, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1323, 1328 (2016); Rolf H. Weber, Disruptive
Technologies and Competition Law, ch. 4.2.1 (Klaus Mathis, New Developments in
Competition Law and Economics, Springer forthcoming); see also Autorité de la
Concurrence, Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data, supra n. 125, at 14-15.
140 On (o)the(r) characteristics that make tacit collusion more likely see Competition
and Markets Authority, Pricing Algorithms, Economic Working Paper on the use of
Algorithms to Facilitate Collusion and Persoanlised Pricing, 8 October 2018, para.
12-15,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/746353/Algorithms_econ_report.pdf; Schwalbe argues that algorithmic
collusion is more difficult to achieve than legal scholars assume, see Ulrich
Schwalbe, Algorithms, Machine Learning, and Collusion, 2-3 for an overview,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=323263; on this category of autonomous machines, cf. also
Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 115, at 1795-1796.
141 ‘[I]nstances of coordination through algorithms are likely to become more
commonplace in our digital world. This also implies that one of the considerations
underlying the rule which treats conscious parallelism as legal – that it can take
place only in a limited number of highly concentrated markets and therefore is likely
to create minor economic effects – no longer holds’ (Michal Gal, Algorithms as
Illegal Agreements, Berkeley Tech. L.J. 44 (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3171977); Picht & Freund, supra n. 109, at 405.
142 Competition and Markets Authority, supra n. 140, at para. 5.27-5.28 and 8.3, also
listing other risk factors related to algorithmic pricing possibly leading to
coordination at para. 8.4-8.7.
143 This feature may, for instance, play out in ‘predictable agent’ cases, that is,
settings, in which competitors unilaterally use algorithmic tools that help to establish
conscious parallelism by generating predictable outcomes and predicting each
other’s results, see Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 115, at 1789-1791.
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than humans to biases and errors which may destabilize established
collusion.144
3.2. Big data + algorithms = market dominance (and abuse)?
Cases relating to the use of algorithms by dominant market players are
slowly moving into the antitrust spotlight. Two prominent examples
are the EU Commission’s Google Shopping and the German
Bundeskartellamt’s Lufthansa case.
3.2[a] Google Search (Shopping)
In one prong of Google’s confrontation with competition agencies,145
the EU Commission had to assess whether Google was abusing its
dominance146 on the search engine market and held the company did
so by demoting rival comparison shopping services in its search
results whilst prominently placing its own (‘Google Shopping’)147.148
The demotion was attributed to several criteria in Google’s search
algorithm and the fact that Google Shopping itself was not subject to
the workings of the algorithm, resulting in significant gain in traffic
for Google Shopping and losses for its competitors.149 The decision
raises several interesting questions, i.a. whether the EU Commission
should have assumed a two-sided market,150 how to categorize
144 Cf. in detail Picht & Freund, supra n. 109, at 405.




146 The EU Commission found Google dominant in general internet search markets
in all 31 countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) since 2008 (except in the
Czech Republic since 2011) and abusing its dominance in all 13 EEA countries in
which it offered Google shopping.
147 It was initially called ‘Froogle’, later ‘Google Product Search’ and now ‘Google
Shopping’.
148 Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping), decision of 27 June 2017,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf.
149 Cf. Commission press release IP/17/1784, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-1784_en.htm.
150 Rupprecht Podszun, Der grosse Donner – hat sich Alphabet vergoogelt?,
https://www.d-kart.de/der-grosse-donner-hat-sich-alphabet-vergoogelt; on two- and
multi-sided markets: Thomas Hoppner, Defining Markets for Multi-Sided Platforms:
The Case of Search Engines, 38(3) WC 349 (2015); Stefan Holzweber, Market
Definition for Multi-Sided Platforms: A Legal Reappraisal, 40(4) WC 536 (2017);
Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy for Two-Sided Markets,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3121481; Lapo Filistrucchi, Damien Geradin, Eric van
Damme & Pauline Affeldt, Market Definition in two-sided Markets: Theroy and
Practice, 10(2) J. Competition L. & Econ. 293 (2014); Sebastian Wismer, Christhan
Bongard & Arno Rasek, Multi-Sided Market Economics in Competition Law
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Google’s abusive conduct,151 and what an appropriate implementation
of the EU Comission’s remedies would look like.152
Evidence in the case included 5.2 Terabytes of search result data
from Google. However, judging from the publicly available
information, the EU Commission does not seem to have had any
special insight into the functioning of Google’s search algorithms. In
order to establish that Google’s algorithms, including one called
‘Panda’, demoted competing shopping comparison services153
according to certain criteria,154 the EU Commission relied on
blogposts and documents,155 as well as the fact that the visibility (i.e.
the rate of appearance and ranking on Google) of competing
comparison shopping services was at the highest before the launch of
Panda and dropped afterwards with no sustainable recovery.156 The
fact that Google Shopping was not subject to the same ranking
mechanism as its competing services was apparently established based
on emails, replies to the Commission’s request for information, and
other data.157
Nor does the Commission attempt to meddle, with the remedies
it ordered, in the design or working of Google’s search algorithm. The
Commission stated, for instance, that ‘the Monitoring Trustee’s
Enforcement, 8(4) JECLAP 257 (2017); Gönenç Gürkaynak, Öznur İnanılır, Sinan
Diniz & Ayşe Gizem Yaşar, Multisided markets and the challenge of incorporating
multisided considerations into competition law analysis, 5(1) Journal of Antitrust
Enforcement 100 (2017).
151 For example, discrimination (cf. Anca Chirita, Google’s Anti-Competitive and
Unfair Practices in Digital Leisure Markets, 11(1) The Competition Law Review
109, 120, 122 (2015); Renato Nazzini, Google and the (Ever-stretching) Boundaries
of Article 102 TFUE [sic], 6(5) JECLAP 301, 307-310 (2015)), tying (pro: Chirita,
id., at 121; Benjamin Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through
Tying and Bundling?, 11(2) J. Competition L. & Econ. 365, 369-378 (2015)), refusal
to supply (contra: Chirita, id., 123; Nazzini, id., at 307-310), margin squeeze
(contra: Nazzini, id., at 307-310) or lack of any abuse and theory (John Lang,
Comparing Microsoft and Google: The Concept of Exclusionary Abuse, 39(1) WC
5, 27-28 (2016); Torsten Körber, Common Errors Regarding Search Engine
Regulation – and How to Avoid Them, 36(6) ECLR 239 (2015)).
152 The EU Commission specified the remedies in its corrected Tender Specification
of 17 July 2017 for Technical Expertise in the case, 4-5,
https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=2629; see for case law
on access remedies and Google’s implementation: Bo Vesterdorf & Kyriakos
Fountoukakos, An Appraisal of the Remedy in the Commission’s Google Search
(Shopping) Decision and a Guide to its Interpretation in Light of an Analytical
Reading of the Case Law, 9(1) JECLAP 3 (2018); calling this a ‘magic stroke’ and
favouring the EU Commission not to fumble with any algorithms: Rupprecht
Podszun, The Google case: First Comments by Haucap, Kersting, Podszun,
https://www.d-kart.de/the-google-case-first-comments.
153 Google Search (Shopping), supra n. 148, at para. 349.
154 Google Search (Shopping), supra n. 148, at para. 352.
155 Google Search (Shopping), supra n. 148, at para. 358.
156 Google Search (Shopping), supra n. 148, at para. 361.
157 Google Search (Shopping), supra n. 148, at para. 380-383.
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functions shall not include … the examination of Google’s Web
Search algorithms’158 and that ‘[t]he objective of the Commission is
not to interfere in Google's search algorithm’.159 Subsequently, the
proposed remedy of equal treatment160 ‘would not interfere with …
the algorithms Google applies’161 and ‘[t]he Commission Decision
does not object to the design of Google’s generic search algorithms or
to demotions as such’.162
Regarding both evidence and remedies, the EU Commission’s
approach focussed – pointedly speaking – more on the market results
of Google’s conduct than on the (in)appropriateness of the algorithmic
design which brought them about.
3.2[b] Lufthansa
In the context of the insolvency of Air Berlin, the German
Bundeskartellamt started a preliminary investigation163 to assess the
initiation of proceedings against Lufthansa164 due to abusive
pricing.165 After Air Berlin’s insolvency, Lufthansa’s algorithmically
determined ticket fares skyrocketed (+ 25-30%) on certain – now
monopolistic – routes.166 In the end, the Bundeskartellamt did not
initiate proceedings because, first, even after Lufthansa had increased
its flight frequency and started using bigger airplanes, a capacity
158 Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740, 3 April 2013, Annex 4, Section A,
para. 6,
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_8608_5.pdf.
159 EU Commission Statement on the Google investigation, 5 February 2014,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-93_en.htm.
160 Cf. on this duty Eduardo Aguilera Valdiviva, The Scope of the ‘Special
Responsibility’ upon Vertically Integrated Dominant Firms after the Google
Shopping Case: Is There a Duty to Treat Rivals Equally and Refrain from
Favouring Own Related Business?, 41(1) WC 43 (2018).
161 Commission MEMO/15/4781, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
4781_en.htm.
162 Commission MEMO/17/1785, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-
1785_en.htm; Valdiviva, supra n. 160, at 66, argues this is because of Google’s
freedom to develop an editorial judgment.




164 Lufthansa-subsidiary Austrian Airlines might also be facing an inquiry involving
pricing algorithms, https://kurier.at/wirtschaft/ueberteuert-behoerde-hat-fluege-
wien-bruessel-im-visier/400051874.




166 Bundeskartellamt, Press release of 29 May 2018, supra n. 163.
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decline of 20% remained.167 Second, due to easyJet’s quick entry into
the market, the price increase was not lasting.168 Finally, the
Bundeskartellamt held the view that it was mainly easyJet and not
Lufthansa that moved into Air Berlin’s market position which resulted
in a market structure comparable to the one before Air Berlin’s
insolvency.169
Nonetheless, the case brings up the important question as to
what extent the insolvency of a competitor – or similar changes in
market structure – have to be considered in the price determination
parameters of an algorithm and whether there is a duty to monitor and
adjust (potentially after a grace period) the algorithm in the event of
such structural changes. This issue gains in significance if insolvency
leads to a dominant position of the remaining market participant,
subjecting the latter to the stricter requirements for dominant
companies. The Bundeskartellamt emphasized that the use of an
algorithm does not exempt a company from its competition law
responsibilities.170 The somewhat simplistic wording of this statement
may have been due to the fact that the algorithm at issue still required
a great deal of human intervention.171 In any case, companies with
substantial market shares are well advised to monitor their market
position and, in case of their exceeding the threshold for market
dominance, to undertake the necessary adjustments from an antitrust
perspective.
3.3. Data protection violations as anticompetitive behaviour?
In March 2016, the Bundeskartellamt initiated proceedings against
Facebook, investigating whether Facebook’s terms of service
regarding user data do not only violate data protection law but also
abuse a dominant position by imposing unfair conditions on Facebook
users.172 According to the authority’s preliminary assessment,
167 Bundeskartellamt, Fallbericht B9-175/17 – Lufthansa, 3,
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/DE/Fallberichte/Missbr
auchsaufsicht/2018/B9-175-17.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4.
168 Bundeskartellamt, Press release of 29 May 2018, supra n. 163.
169 Bundeskartellamt, Fallbericht B9-175/17 – Lufthansa, supra n. 167, at 3.
170 ‘The answer seems simple: companies cannot hide behind algorithms that they
use, and in the meantime Lufthansa has acknowledged this’ (Andreas Mundt, Sixty
years and still exciting – the Bundeskartellamt in the digital era, 6(1) JAE 1, 3
(2018)).
171 ‘[T]he airlines specify the framework data and set the parameters for dynamic
price adjustment separately for each flight. The airlines also actively manage
changes to these framework data and enter unanticipated events manually, which
are not automatically accounted for by the system’ (Bundeskartellamt, Press release
of 29 May 2018, supra n. 163).
172 Bundeskartellamt, press release of 2 March 2016,
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/201
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Facebook is, in fact, dominant in the (German) market for social
networks.173 As to abuse, ‘[t]he authority holds the view that
Facebook is abusing this dominant position by making the use of its
social network conditional on its being allowed to limitlessly amass
every kind of data generated by using third-party websites and merge
it with the user's Facebook account. These third-party sites include
firstly services owned by Facebook such as WhatsApp or Instagram,
and secondly websites and apps of other operators with embedded
Facebook APIs’.174 ‘If a third-party website has embedded Facebook
products such as the “like” button or a “Facebook login” option or
analytical services such as “Facebook Analytics”, data will be
transmitted to Facebook via APIs the moment the user calls up that
third party's website for the first time. These data can be merged with
data from the user's Facebook account, even if the user has blocked
web tracking in his browser or device settings’.175 ‘Participation in
Facebook's network is conditional on registration and unrestricted
approval of its terms of service. Users are given the choice of either
accepting the “whole package” or doing without the service …
According to the Bundeskartellamt's preliminary assessment,
Facebook's terms of service are at least in this aspect inappropriate’176
– as exploitative business terms177 – ‘and violate data protection
provisions to the disadvantage of its users. In view of the company's
dominant position, it can also not be assumed that users effectively
consent to this form of data collection and processing’.178 Regarding
the theory of harm (economically) legitimizing its intervention, the
Bundeskartellamt realizes the need to develop a creative approach as
Facebook’s services are for free and the company’s (potentially)
exploitative business terms do not, therefore, inflict direct financial
losses on Facebook users.179 However, the Bundeskartellamt says,
6/02_03_2016_Facebook.html?nn=3591568; cf. also Robert McLeod, Novel But a
Long Time Coming: The Bundeskartellamt Takes on Facebook, 7(6) JECLAP 367
(2016).
173 Bundeskartellamt, Preliminary assessment in Facebook proceeding, 19 December
2017,
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/201
7/19_12_2017_Facebook.html?nn=3591568.; for details, cf. Bundeskartellamt,
Background information on the Facebook proceeding, 19 December 2017, 3,
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Diskussions_Hintergr
undpapiere/2017/Hintergrundpapier_Facebook.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6.
174 Bundeskartellamt, Preliminary assessment in Facebook proceeding, supra n. 173.
API stands for ‘application programming interface’ and consists of building blocks
that a programmer can use to more easily create a computer program.
175 Bundeskartellamt, Background information on the Facebook proceeding, supra n.
173, at 2.
176 Bundeskartellamt, Preliminary assessment in Facebook proceeding, supra n. 173.
177 Bundeskartellamt, Background information on the Facebook proceeding, supra n.
173, at 4.
178 Bundeskartellamt, Preliminary assessment in Facebook proceeding, supra n. 173.
179 Bundeskartellamt, Background information on the Facebook proceeding, supra n.
173, at 4.
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‘[t]he damage for the users lies in a loss of control: they are no longer
able to control how their personal data are used. … Facebook's
merging of the data thus also constitutes a violation of the users'
constitutionally protected right to informational self-determination’.180
A core, and novel, feature of the Facebook case consists in a
very close interaction between data protection law and competition
law. According to the concept of the Bundeskartellamt, algorithmic
data collection and data processing that violate (digital) data
protection provisions can result in a breach of the obligations
competition law imposes on dominant undertakings. This is the case
because – in the authority’s words – ‘[w]here access to the personal
data of users is essential for the market position of a company, the
question of how that company handles the personal data of its users is
no longer only relevant for data protection authorities. It becomes a
relevant question for the competition authorities, too. … In the digital
economy, the collection and processing of data is an entrepreneurial
activity that has great relevance for the competitive performance of a
company. The legislator has acknowledged this relevance and in
§ 18(3a) of the German Competition Act made access to personal data
a criterion for market power, especially in the case of online platforms
and networks’.181 Moreover, the authority considers data protection
‘principles’ instructive on whether Facebook’s terms and conditions
are exploitative in a competition law sense.182 ‘In its assessment the
Bundeskartellamt includes the principles of the harmonised European
data protection rules, in particular the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which will enter into force in May 2018, but also
the currently applicable 95/46 EC Data Protection Directive, which
can be directly applied to cases under § 19(1) GWB’.183 ‘Monitoring
the data processing activities of dominant companies is … an essential
task of the competition authority which cannot be fulfilled by a data
protection authority … For this purpose, the Bundeskartellamt works
closely with data protection authorities’.184 Confident as these
statements sound, the combined application of competition and data
protection law and the delineation of the respective agencies’
180 Bundeskartellamt, Background information on the Facebook proceeding, supra n.
173, at 4.
181 Bundeskartellamt, Background information on the Facebook proceeding, supra n.
173, at 1-2.
182 Bundeskartellamt, Background information on the Facebook proceeding, supra n.
173, at 4.
183 Bundeskartellamt, Background information on the Facebook proceeding, supra n.
173, at 5-6.
184 Bundeskartellamt, Background information on the Facebook proceeding, supra n.
173, at 2.
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purviews pose considerable challenges. Hence, it comes as no surprise
that the Bundeskartellamt’s approach is controversial.185
3.4. Further constellations
The selected case-law presented here does, of course, not comprise all
problematic settings that present algorithmic markets, let alone their
development towards the use of ever more complex, self-learning and
‘intelligent’ technology may pose. Access for competitors to superior
algorithmic/AI-tools; dynamic, personalized pricing;186 more
generally, many-facetted discrimination resulting from the
economically rational and statically efficient (inter)actions of
algorithmic business agents; new types of merger control remedies
addressing, for instance, impediments to competition resulting from
the merger of big data portfolios187 and algorithmic infrastructure or
the divestiture of AI-systems and the know-how they embody – these
are among the constellations likely to keep competition authorities
busy in the future. What can the present algorithm-related case-law
and the look at other legal areas contribute to preparing competition
law enforcement for these challenges?
185 Contra: Marixenia Davilla, Is Big Data a Different Kind of Animal? The
Treatment of Big Data Under the EU Competition Rules, 8(6) JECLAP 381 (2017);
advocating a holistic approach between competition, consumer and data protection
law: Wolfang Kerber, Digital Markets, Data, and Privacy: Competition Law,
Consumer Law, and Data Protection, 11(11) JIPLP 856, 865-866 (2016); pro:
Giulia Schneider, Testing Art. 102 TFEU in the Digital Marketplace: Insights from
the Bundeskartellamt’s investigation against Facebook, 9(4) JECLAP 213, 214, 225
(2018).
186 It could be argued that Art. 22 GDPR already establishes a duty to inform about
personalized pricing because profiling concerns data about someone’s economic
situation, cf. Art. 4(4) and Recital 71; see Maurits Dolmans, Artificial Intelligence
and the Future of Competition law – Further Thoughts, Presentation from 2 May
2017, slide 20,
https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/event/dolmans.pdf; Michal Gal
argues that from an antitrust perspective, it is harder that companies coordinate
dynamic pricing unless there are division agreements or the same data pool is being
used (Caron Beaton-Wells, supra n. 116, https://overcast.fm/+N2zZD5F3Q/35:04);
the Competition and Markets Authority concludes that explicit collusion and
personalized pricing are compatible but unlikely to occur together, tacit
coordination, on the other hand, and personalized pricing very unlikely to occur
together, Competition and Markets Authority, supra n. 140, at para. 7.31-7.44.
187 Arguing, however, against special treatment of big data under the EU
competition law framework: Davilla, supra. n. 185.
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4. Where competition law might learn and improve
Among the many lessons and proposals for the development of
competition law that one might draw from the previous sections of
this contribution, we want to highlight the following:
(1) Competition authorities ought to improve the factual and
analytical foundation on which they base their decisions and
policies.188 This suggests not only additional inquiries into
sectors on which digitalization and ‘algorithmization’ have a
strong impact.189 MiFID II,190 for instance, shows that algorithm
users’ duties to inform and document can contribute a lot to
keeping authorities (at least theoretically) up-to-date. When
specific issues arise, authorities should be able and willing to
carry out – be it alone or in cooperation with the involved
undertakings – ‘sandboxing’ exercises, i.e. the testing of
algorithms or AI systems in a protected model environment.191
Some suggest, inter alia with regard to Swiss competition law,192
that firms may submit their algorithms to the respective
competition law authority for analysis and clearance.193 A
188 Rupprecht Podszun, The More Technological Approach: Competition Law in the
Digital Economy, 101, 107 (Gintarė Surblytė, Competition on the Internet, Springer
2015); cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 2018, supra n. 122, at para. 240;
the German Bundeskartellamt and the French Autorité de la concurrence launched a
joint project on algorithms and their implications on competition aiming at




189 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 2018, supra n. 122, at para. 233-237,
also evaluating the right of consumer protection organisations to request sector
inquiries by amending § 34a of the German Act against Restraints of Competition
(Competition Act – GWB).
190 Cf. supra section 2.1.
191 Cf. supra section 2.3 under ‘testing and monitoring’.
192 Picht & Freund, supra n. 109, at 408.
193 The FTC, for instance, established the Office of Technology Research and
Investigation (https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-
protection/office-technology-research-investigation) that will also play an important
role in helping the FTC understand how algorithms and AI software work in
particular markets (remarks of former FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny,
Algorithms and Coordinated Effects, University of Oxford Center for Competition
Law and Policy, May 22, 2017, 6,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1220673/mcsweeny_
-_oxford_cclp_remarks_-_algorithms_and_coordinated_effects_5-22-17.pdf);
similarly, to deal with algorithms, AI and big data, the UK’s competition and
Markets Authority is building a technology team
(https://www.ft.com/content/349103ba-c631-11e7-b2bb-322b2cb39656;
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-appoints-stefan-hunt-to-top-digital-role).
It even declared: ‘Competition authorities and regulators can and do use algorithms
to detect cartels. The CMA has created a cartel screening tool to help procurers
screen their tender data for signs of cartel behaviour. This software looks at factors
including the text of the bids. It is unlikely the features of collusion relevant to
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positive result of such an ‘ex-ante audit’ could mitigate the risk
of being sanctioned for unwanted effects the respective
algorithms generate when used in a real-world environment.
This option may be particularly attractive regarding ‘black box
algorithms’ whose reactions to complex settings are difficult to
predict.194
(2) Customers can have great difficulties deciphering complex
algorithmic market conduct, detecting practices harmful to them,
and defending their interests against such practices. A healthy
level of private competition law enforcement195 – especially
for stand-alone cases without prior competition authority
proceedings – may therefore require specific customer
information rights,196 keyed to customers’ comprehension and
resources, thereby enabling them to effectively protect their
interests.
(3) Competition on digital markets is, as yet, less well understood
than competitive processes on more traditional, ‘brick-and-
mortar’ markets, it is rapidly changing and these characteristics
will last well into the future. Besides addressing anticompetitive
behaviour ex post, competition authorities should therefore
strengthen their ex-ante monitoring197 of digital markets, in
particular regarding undertakings which have already violated
competition law and subsequently altered their algorithmic
conduct in order to (purportedly) terminate the violation. Such
preventive monitoring should, however, not gravitate towards a
– highly impracticable and anti-innovative – scenario in which
new algorithms or AI systems (legally or factually) require ex-
ante authorization to be put on the market.198
(4) To perform the increased analytical and monitoring activities
sketched above, competition authorities need additional
resources (know-how, tools, skilled staff, etc.).199 In the
comparing detailed tenders to prevent bid-rigging will be useful in identifying price
fixing tacit coordination collusion in online retail markets’ (Competition and
Markets Authority, supra n. 140, fn. 22); see also Schwalbe, supra n. 140, at 22;
infra n. 199.
194 OECD, supra n. 4, at 47-48.
195 This includes the private enforcement of rules against unfair competition.
196 Cf. supra section 2.3 under ‘transparency’.
197 Cf. supra section 2.3 under ‘testing and monitoring’.
198 Google for example, changes its algorithm 500-600 times each year,
https://moz.com/google-algorithm-change.
199 Cf. also supra n. 193; in Switzerland, the Competition Commission has
mentioned the possibility to employ technical specialists
(https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/das-anliegen-der-fair-preis-initiative-ist-berechtigt-
ld.1391008) and is at least building on its technical expertise
(https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/wenn-algorithmen-kartelle-bilden-ld.1415028);
Margrethe Vestager publicly discussed employing algorithms to detect collusion
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aftermath of the Google Search (Shopping) decision, for
instance, the EU was looking for a technical expert200 to monitor
compliance with and implementation of the decision.201 The
expert’s tasks were rather challenging and included the
assessment – depending also on Google’s means of
implementation of the remedy – of ‘the processes and methods
deciding the positioning and display of Google's comparison
shopping service, as well as of competing comparison shopping
services in Google's general search results pages in response to a
query, including relevance standards, ranking algorithms,
adjustment or demotion mechanisms and their respective
conditions, parameters and/or signals’.202
(5) The complex and rapidly changing nature of algorithmic
conduct and markets suggests a ‘results-based approach’203
which entitles authorities to intervene where they detect
anticompetitive market outcomes, even if they do not
(immediately) manage to prove flaws in algorithmic design or
the presence of subjective elements, such as knowledge or
intention.204 In fact, this may constitute a viable long-term
strategy for competition authorities in the digital era. However,
as the results of complex, even self-learning algorithms and their
interactions with other (algorithmic) market forces can be very
hard for undertakings to predict and control,205 a results-based
approach may generate excessively strict liability absent limiting
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-antitrust-algorithm/eu-considers-using-
algorithms-to-detect-anti-competitive-acts-idUSKBN1I5198; Michal Gal is
suggesting that competition authorities build on technical expertise, also considering
that possible remedies may include orders to stop using the algorithm (altogether or
only part of it), to not disclose the algorithm to competitors or to amend the




201 See Tender Specifications, corrected version of 17 July 2017, 3,
https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=27867.
202 Id., at 6.
203 Cf. also Gal, supra n. 141, at 44: ‘Furthermore, the digital world increases the
Paradox of Proof, in that market conditions make it easier to coordinate, and at the
same time make it more difficult to prove the existence of an explicit agreement
given that explicit inter-firm communication may be less essential. This suggests
that, while the danger of harm might increase, it might also be less likely to find
strong evidentiary inferences of an agreement. It is thus be time to rethink our laws
and focus on reducing harms to social welfare rather than on what constitutes an
agreement. There may well be a case for not binding ourselves to past formulations
which no longer fit economic realities. In particular, the time may be ripe to
reconsider prohibiting any conduct with potential anticompetitive tendencies, with
no offsetting pro-competitive ones, even where such conduct does not constitute an
agreement in the traditional sense.’
204 Picht & Freund, supra n. 109, at 408.
205 Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 2018, supra n. 122, at para. 170; Picht &
Freund, supra n. 109, at 408.
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concepts such as a predictability defense, a ‘notice and re-
adjustment’ mechanism, or an exculpatory defense where an
algorithm was designed according to due diligence
procedures.206 At the very least, authorities must consider such
factors in their sanction regimes. At the same time, clearly
undue conduct with regard to monitoring one’s own algorithms,
informing correctly about them, and reacting to perceivable
anticompetitive results of their operations should loom large
among the factors triggering (severe) competition law sanctions.
(6) Compliance by default and by design can serve as a policy
element complementary to a results-based approach. The GDPR
concept of privacy by design (Art. 25 para. 1 GDPR) requires
companies to implement technical and organizational measures
at the earliest stages of design in such a way that privacy and
data protection principles are safeguarded right from the start.
EU Commissioner Vestager advocated this standard of conduct
for competition law as well, stating that ‘[w]hat businesses can –
and must – do is to ensure antitrust compliance by design. That
means pricing algorithms need to be built in a way that doesn't
allow them to collude. Like a more honourable version of the
computer HAL in the film 2001, they need to respond to an offer
of collusion by saying “I'm sorry, I'm afraid I can't do that”.’207
Indeed, undertakings should structure their digital tools in a way
that promises these tools to operate in a procompetitive manner
(procompetitiveness by design). Furthermore, the most
procompetitive configuration of a tool should form the pre-
installed standard configuration (procompetitiveness by
default).208 Some authors suggest that, regarding simple pricing
algorithms, this may mean that the algorithms ought to be set
not to react to price changes when they result from certain
companies209 or not to follow and match price increases by
206 Nicolo Zingales, Google Shopping: beware of ‘self-favouring’ in a world of
algorithmic nudging, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/google-
shopping-beware-of-self-favouring-in-a-world-of-algorithmic-nudging.
207 This quote was preceded by the following remarks: ‘And I think the EU’s new
rules on data protection, which will come into force next year, give us valuable ideas
about how we can face that challenge. The concept of “data protection by design”
makes clear that people’s privacy can never be an afterthought. It has to be built into
the way that services work from the very start. That's also how businesses need to
think when they design and use algorithms. They may not always know exactly how




208 Privacy by default (Art. 25 para. 2 GDPR) requires companies to process
personal data with the highest privacy protection in a way that by default personal
data is not accessible to an indefinite number of persons.
209 Antonio Gomes, Disruptive Innovation, Big Data and Algorithms, OECD
Presentation of 31 August 2017, slide 40,
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competitors but only their price decreases.210 Others, like the
German Monopolies Commission, point to the risk that very
rigid regulatory stipulations may block legitimate algorithmic
pricing strategies and create barriers to market entry by raising
regulatory costs.211 The OECD mentions regulatory intervention
by way of rules on algorithm design, preventing, for instance,
algorithms from reacting to features or variables necessary for
tacit collusion. However, the OECD underlines also that such
rules place considerable supervising burdens on agencies.212 The
really intricate step is, in any case, to identify what the design
and the default should be in complex scenarios. The design of
regulatory stipulations for pricing algorithms will be particularly
challenging with regard to deep learning algorithms that are not
supposed to follow an immutable, pre-programmed pricing
pattern. Sometimes, previous experience will tell that a
particular setting has a tendency to produce non-compliant
results and that it should, therefore, not be the design and
default. Sometimes, economic theory or sandbox exercises213
will be capable of singling out design/default-worthy
configurations, although the growing complexity of (the
interactions of) algorithmic/AI systems tends to complicate such
predictions. Standard setting214 may, in some instances, define
compliant configurations that can serve as a reference point for
both undertakings and authorities. Where previous experience,
clear results from testing or theory, convincing standards or
similar guidance is not at hand, though, competition law
enforcement must be careful not to place excessive liability
burdens on the market players215 by considering every
undesirable market outcome as the result of a design/default
violation.
(7) The compensatory and, in particular, the steering purpose of
competition law’s liability rules depend not least on the clear
distribution of responsibilities among the involved players. In
the digital world, characteristic facets of this challenge are the
http://www.sic.gov.co/sites/default/files/documentos/092017/antonio-ferreira-
gomes-disruptive-innovation-big-data-and-algorithms.pptx.
210 Paolo Siciliani, Tackling Algorithmic-Faciliated Tacit Collusion in a
Proportionate Way, JECLAP 1, 2 (forthcoming); identifying this as a topic for
further research while also pointing out that the underlying rationale of maximizing
firm profit might make this ‘too interventionist and damage the competitive process
to restrict firms’ ability to set its own prices’, Competition and Markets Authority,
supra n. 140, at para. 9.1(b).
211 Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 2018, supra n. 122, at para. 251; cf. also
Gomes, supra n. 209, slide 40.
212 OECD, supra n. 4, at 50.
213 Cf. supra section 2.3 under ‘testing and monitoring’.
214 Cf. supra section 2.3 under ‘standard setting’.
215 Zingales, supra n. 206.
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liability distribution between developers, implementers,216 and
users of algorithms/AI systems,217 especially where developer
and implementer do not belong to the same company and where
users engage not merely in passive consumption but also in
active configuration or even co-shaping activity. Competition
law has yet to get down to the nitty-gritty of appropriate liability
rules for these relationships. Monitoring obligations for
developers may be a helpful element of such rules, especially
where a developer caters to numerous implementers and gains,
therefore, a bird’s-eye view on the issues its algorithms/AI
systems may raise. Some propose that digital platforms
establishing a marketplace should be requested to oversee or
even limit the pricing conduct of their market participants, for
instance by built-in delays for price changes to go live or by
allowing price changes only every couple of days.218
Incentivizing parties to clearly document who decided on the
specifications for a system may be worthwhile as well, for
instance by granting developers a ‘client’s choice defence’ if an
(anticompetitive) setting was requested by the implementer. To
avoid effective sanctioning – especially in high-damage private
enforcement cases – to be undercut by the (intentional)
insolvency of small algo-developers, a subsidiary liability of
implementers could incentivize them to request that developers
take solvency measures.
(8) As in other areas which display(ed) rapid technological progress
and a strong potential for further innovation, protecting the
dynamic efficiency of algorithmic/AI markets becomes both a
major and a difficult task for competition law.219 Everybody
wants innovation but nobody is – or will ever be – able to
designate the mathematical formula for calculating which forms
of market structure and conduct yield the best innovation results.
Nonetheless, competition law must neither disregard dynamic
efficiency nor turn it into an unspecific knockout argument for
justifying whatever option decision-makers prefer. Instead,
competition law and practice must keep working on
concretisations of the innovation paradigm which provide
guidance in concrete cases. To propose examples, a very strict
liability for anticompetitive outcomes in complex algorithmic
markets, detailed and inflexible requirements for the design of
algorithms/AI systems, as well as micro-managing remedies are
216 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 2018, supra n. 122, at para. 215,
according to which algorithms represent the prior will of the user but a shift in
liability may have to be considered regarding self-learning algorithms.
217 Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 2018, supra n. 122, at para. 252-273.
218 Siciliani, supra n. 210, at 4.
219 See also Podszun, supra n. 188, at 108.
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likely to be more of a hindrance than a help for the dynamic
efficiency of the affected markets.
5. Conclusion and outlook: The interaction between
competition law and other (regulatory) areas of the law
The increase of algorithmic and – in the future – of AI-based market
conduct impacts competition in ways the case-law reflects today and
in ways we do not yet perceive. To defend competition against the
negative part of this impact, competition law and enforcement must
develop in some respects. The experiences and rules made by other
areas of the law can help to guide this process. We have taken a closer
look at data protection law and financial markets regulation, but these
are by far not the only relevant fields. One trend goes towards the
setting of ethical rules for AI.220 Although not addressed in detail here,
rules against unfair competition are another major element, both as a
template for and a tool complementary to the provisions against
cartels and abuse of dominance. Dynamic and/or individualized
pricing, for instance, may well be a type of conduct to be addressed
more appropriately by unfair competition rules than by other parts of
competition law.221
At the same time, thinking about a competition law for the
digital era raises the question of how this competition law ought to
interact with neighbouring areas of the law which also claim to set
rules for the digital world. The present contribution cannot go on to
analyse this complex interplay in detail, but it proposes four theses
which, hopefully, help to fuel future research and discussion:
(1) Competition law and enforcement should stand back if and
insofar another set of rules exists/evolves that provides an
appropriate legal framework for the algorithmic/AI-economy.
Such a framework must safeguard the protective purposes of
competition law, as well as effective enforcement.






221 Cf. Florent Thouvenin, Dynamische Preise, Eine Herausforderung für das
Datenschutz-, Wettbewerbs- und Vertragsrecht, Jusletter IT 22 September 2016,
para 29-46; Picht & Freund, supra n. 109, at 407: ‘algorithm-based individual price
differentiation is—so far—something like a “Loch Ness Monster”, often conjured-
up but rarely, if ever, reliably detected’; the Competition & Markets Authority, did
not find much evidence of it in practice either; cf. in detail: Competition and
Markets Authority, supra n. 140, para. 7.7-7.26 & Annex I, esp. para. 1 and 17.
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(2) At present, however, neither competition nor any other area of
the law seem optimally equipped to address the issues arising
from algorithms and AI.222
(3) If areas other than competition law undertake to tackle the new
issues, they ought to strive for rules that sync with competition
law. In case they are intended to derogate competition law, these
rules must incorporate competition law’s protective purposes.
(4) Where competition law needs to intervene, it must be enabled to
do so appropriately and effectively. This is where the tools
discussed in section 4 come into play. Even using them,
‘[c]ompetition rules can't solve every problem on their own. But
they can make an important contribution to keeping digital
markets level and open’.223
(5) A stand-alone, all-encompassing and fine-meshed regulatory
framework for AI and algorithmic market activity should –
although proposed by some scholars224 – not be implemented at
present.225 Sufficient empirical data and experience on which to
base such legislation are, as yet, not available. Furthermore,
trying to cover all pertinent legal concerns and legitimate party
interests in a single regulatory act seems, to say the least,
demanding. Undertaking, under the present circumstances,
sweeping regulation risks generating incoherencies, hindering
innovation226 as well as the market entry of new players, and
222 Cf. supra section 3.
223 Margrethe Vestager’s speech in Munich on Competition in a big data world,
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements
/competition-big-data-world_en.
224 Gawer, for instance, suggests the creation of an independent digital regulator
coordinating and supervising aspects of internet and data, see Annabelle Gawer,
Competition Policy and Regulatory Reforms for Big Data: Propositions to Harness
the Power of Big Data while Curbing Platforms’ Abuse of Dominance, note
submitted to the hearing on Big Data of the 126th meeting of the OECD
Competition Committee,
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2016)74/en/pdf; Scherer proposes
enacting an Artificial Intelligence Development Act (AIDA) which would give an
agency the competence to certify AI systems with the consequence of limited tort
liability for certified programs compared to strict joint and several liability for
uncertified programs, see Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence
Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29(2) Harv. J.L. & Tech.
354, 353-400 (2016),
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v29/29HarvJLTech353.pdf.
225 Cf. also the relatively conservative approach of the OECD, supra n. 4, at 50.
226 For instance, the development of new, desirable algorithmic tools, cf. OECD,
supra n. 4, at 47; cf. also Vlad Dan Roman, Digital Markets and Pricing Algorithms
– a Dynamic Approach Towards Horizontal Competition, 39(1) ECLR 37, 44
(2018); FTC Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen with regards to net neutrality regulation:
‘[i]n dynamic, innovative industries like internet services, an ex post case-by-case
enforcement-based approach has advantages over ex ante prescriptive regulation. It
mitigates the regulator’s knowledge problem and allows legal principles to evolve
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resulting in a body of law that needs continuous maintenance
and adjustments. Although it may seem less appealing at first
sight, an evolutionary approach that moves step-by-step, using
and harmonizing various complementary areas of the law may
prove the wiser way of framing our digital future.
incrementally. A case-by-case approach also focuses on actual or likely,
specifically-pled harms rather than having to predict future hypothetical harms’
(https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1231563/mko_rif_c
omment_7-17-2017_final.pdf).
